

21 July 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Comment on Statements Made by Mr. Samuel A. Adams, 20 July 1973, in Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee

Attachment: 3 pp paper by Mr. Adams, containing supplementary testimony made by him on 20 July 1973

1. Paragraph 2 of Attachment states:

*In June 1971, I completed a memorandum, about 40 pages long, which was based on a review of all available evidence. Shortly after I handed the paper in, it was killed; I was threatened with firing, and told to work on weekends for the foreseeable future. I did so -- that is I worked a seven-day week -- throughout the summer of 1971. I would respectfully submit that this was a rare instance in which an intelligence analyst was punished during time of war for finding an enemy army.**

*It is my understanding that Committee questioning of Mr. Adams elicited the further statement that I was his boss at the time.

These statements are highly inaccurate and seriously misleading.

2. Mr. Adams had been detailed to my office in November 1970, on an indefinite basis, from his parent office, the Office of Economic Research (OER). Early in 1971 I had commissioned him to do a thorough and objective study of the development of Communism in Cambodia, political and military, the working deadline for completion of the paper to be June 1971. The question of Cambodian Communist O.B. was to be one aspect considered -- but only one aspect -- in that much broader paper.

3. My office, SRS, did not have responsibility for following O.B. and other military developments in Indochina. Responsibility for such military matters lay principally with Mr. Adams' parent office, OER, and to some degree with certain other offices of CIA.

4. Not only had I not commissioned Mr. Adams (at any time) to do a Cambodian O.B. memorandum, but

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I learned about its existence only after he had distributed copies of it around, without my prior knowledge or consent, or without checking that memorandum's judgments with his immediate supervisor, [REDACTED] my Deputy, or with me.

5. Re Mr. Adams' statement, *"Shortly after I handed the paper in, it was killed...."*

a. Mr. Adams had not "handed in" his paper, in the first place.

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b. His paper was not "killed." At my initiative, Mr. [REDACTED] assisted Mr. Adams in preparing a more finished memorandum. Mr. [REDACTED] furthermore arranged an informal meeting of CIA Indochina specialists, convened to give Mr. Adams a chance to voice his case and present his evidence.

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That meeting was held on 22 June 1971, attended by Mr. Adams, Mr. [REDACTED] officers from OER, and officers from four other CIA offices. Mr. [REDACTED] subsequently reported to me that Mr. Adams had received a good hearing, and had found some sympathy

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there with his general thesis that existing CIA estimates on Cambodian Communist O.B. were too low.

c. Mr. Adams returned to work thereafter on the broad SRS study on the Cambodian Communists, of which O.B. continued to be one aspect. Production deadlines came and went, that study dragging on, finally being published in February 1972, eight months late. That political-military study was a good one. It had been reviewed carefully by all the other offices of CIA having responsibilities for such questions. All were in general accord with it, and considered it a good job, as did I. One point at issue in the study, however, remained: that of the Khmer Communist O.B. Mr. Adams and his OER colleagues still could not agree, though in the process of coordination he had been able to get them to raise their Cambodian Communist O.B. substantially -- to new, higher figures which appeared in the final, February 1972, published version of our SRS paper.

d. All this does not exactly add up to "killing" Mr. Adams' O.B. theses. In fact, through my office's formal publication of February 1972, Mr. Adams was able to see in print substantially higher O.B. estimates than CIA had previously carried. He had thus been able to sell much of his O.B. thesis to his fellow specialists. They did not in the end buy his O.B. estimates 100%. But his were simply the views of one analyst, and available data did not substantiate his estimates, or anyone else's, as "the truth." Moreover, during those weeks Mr. Adams had somewhat depreciated his estimative credibility among his fellow analysts, including myself, by having voiced other, wildly pessimistic estimates, concerning the course of battle in Indochina, which had not been borne out by events.

e. At my initiative, Mr. Adams subsequently prepared a revised version of that broad February study at a lesser level of security classification, so that the study's findings could have broad

distribution. That revised paper was published in May of 1972, eleven months after Mr. Adams says his O.B. work had been "killed."

6. Re Mr. Adams' statement, *"I was threatened with firing..."*

a. On 24 June 1971, Mr. [REDACTED] and 25X1A
I met with Mr. Adams. I told Mr. Adams that, having had a decent and responsive inter-office hearing for his O.B. theses, he was to focus his energies upon promptly finishing his assigned SRS research project. I told him further that, except for routine matters, he simply had to be responsive to his supervisors, Mr. [REDACTED] and myself, and had to work through us and with our assistance -- as had been the case in our having got him a 25X1A responsible hearing for his theses. I told Mr. Adams, further, that in the event he could not be 25X1A so responsive, and tried again to deceive Mr. [REDACTED] or me or to free-wheel on his own, without our consent, that I would then inform higher authority

in CIA that his experimental tour in SRS had not worked out.

b. I wish to emphasize that my stern remarks were not occasioned by the substance of Mr. Adams' O.B. judgments, but by his operating style. Furthermore, I believe that this was
25X1A perfectly clear to Mr. Adams -- as it was to Mr.

██████████ - at the time. Mr. Adams' present representation of these matters seems to me to constitute a rewriting of history.

7. Re Mr. Adams' statement, *"I was...told to work on weekends for the foreseeable future. I did so -- that is I worked a seven-day week -- throughout the summer of 1971."*

a. Neither Mr. ██████████ nor myself told Mr. Adams to work on weekends at that time (June 1971) or any other time.

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b. I was not aware at the time that he worked weekends -- if indeed he did -- throughout the summer of 1971, nor at any time prior to seeing

his (Attached) assertion to this effect on July 20, 1973.

c. The only time that he ever claimed to have been working weekends was more than a year and a half later, in February 1973, when he made such a statement to Mr. [REDACTED] and me. We were both surprised at that time, inasmuch as we had neither directed such work nor seen any evidence of office work produced therefrom.

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d. If Mr. Adams did indeed choose to work some weekends -- of which there is no office record -- it seems to me reasonable to conclude that it was the result of his being months and months behind in completing earlier, regularly-assigned SRS work, and of having used great portions of office time during the week in pursuit of his own purposes.

8. Re Mr. Adams' statement, *"I would respectfully submit that this was a rare instance in which an intelligence analyst was punished during*

time of war for finding an enemy army." I am afraid that that statement is much more elegant than accurate.

a. Mr. Adams was at no time ordered to work weekends.

b. SRS assisted him to make a strong substantive impact upon O.B. estimates.

c. He was at no time punished in any way for the particular estimative judgments he made.


d. He was reprimanded for his behavior, for not conducting himself (in my view) in such a manner that people could count upon him -- whether in meeting schedules or in keeping his word.

e. A requirement for good estimators in our work is humility. Mr. Adams, as I see it, has once more declared his own infallibility and inflated his own role. He did not discover the Cambodian Communist forces, they were there all the time. More importantly, the USG knew so. Mr. Adams did indeed contribute to what I believe to be

a more nearly accurate estimate of Khmer Communist O.B. than was officially held before he carried out his research in SRS, but he was one of several contributors, not the whole show.

f. Finally, I would respectfully submit, to use Mr. Adams' phrasing, that North Vietnamese and Vietcong military forces have also been an important factor and presence in Cambodia, a consideration which Mr. Adams acknowledged while he was a USG analyst, but has apparently minimized since.

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Chief, DD/I Special Research Staff



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23 July 1973

TO: Mr. James R. Woolsey
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Jim:

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Per our phone conversation of this afternoon I forward herewith a memorandum by [REDACTED] Chief, DDI Special Research Staff, responding to certain statements made to the Committee by Mr. Samuel A. Adams on 20 July 1973.

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John M. Maury
Legislative Counsel

Enclosure